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This study constructs and tests a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some 
investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price 
changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. The contribution of the present work is 
the inclusion of institutional investor bias. As such it extends theory. But it also conducts 
econometric tests by using daily survey data on individual and institutional investors’ sentiment 
on the current economic situation and their future expectations. Empirical findings may imply 
that institutions’ sentiment reverts quicker to the equilibrium price than individual sentiment, at 
least with regard to their beliefs on future economic outlook. If studied further with a bigger 
dataset, it may imply that institutional investors are closer to the rational-decision making 
mechanism compared to individual investors. The theoretical framework rests on prospect 
theory. The market studied is the US equity market, however findings and suggestions can be 
applied to global markets and various financial instruments.  
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Attempting to predict future prices or price returns of financial assets is a recurring theme in the 
finance literature. The lack of inclusion of human sentiment and bias that was marked by 
modern portfolio theory’s (Markowitz, 1952) normative approach with the basic premise of the 
rational decision maker as financial actor, has been complemented by behavioral finance 
explanations of limited or bounded rationality. As such Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory has explored new venues of approaching human thinking and behavior. 
Deleveraging the previously praised decision-making processes of the homo economicus 
whose actions were believed to rely solely on the evaluation of all possible statistical outcomes 










derived from sentiment inherent in social animals should not be ignored in the decision-making 
process. Thaler (1980) pioneered economic studies and underscored that in certain situations 
consumers do not necessarily exhibit an economic theoretically prescribed attitude. Those are 
the instances where normative theories of decision-making are prone to systematic errors in 
predicting behavior.  
The aim of this study is to revisit the Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing model “X-
CAPM” study of Barberis et al. (2015) by introducing a new financial actor into the model: the 




The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), which is considered the 
milestone of asset pricing, provides a rough estimation of what the asset price return will be for 
putting funds at risk and foregoing another type of investment. Numerous models, based on 
critiques due to failed empirical tests and suggestions for betterment with extensions and 
modifications of the CAPM are available in the asset pricing literature.  
The X-CAPM study seeks to reconcile survey-based investor sentiment data originally 
described by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) with empirical evidence on the aggregate stock 
market using a modified consumption-based capital asset pricing model. The authors’ rationale 
is that prior studies in this genre rely on “traditional”, “behavioral” or “belief”-based models not 
compatible with this data. This model comprises two investor groups, where the primary 
underlying assumption is that rational investors and extrapolators hold different beliefs about 
future stock returns. It is this incompatibility between real-life survey-based data and observed 
stylized facts of stock returns that the X-CAPM model tries to capture. The central proposition of 
the model is that even in an economy where the extrapolator-rational investor composition is 
equal, the extrapolated effect on prices is not completely remedied by rational investors, and 
thus, prices do not immediately go back to their “normal levels”. The stated reason is that 
rational investors tend to be risk-averse and, thus, do not completely counteract the 
overvaluation caused by the extrapolators. This is the amplification mechanism caused by the 
existence of extrapolators who put  “too much weight” on a news shock as opposed to the 
reaction a rational investor would exhibit.  
Although it is not specifically voiced by the authors, it is this section that comes closest 
to the title of their study. In their consumption-based extrapolators’ sentiment integrated beta 
calculation, which is a derivation of the present value of the some of future dividends, they 
propose an alternative beta calculation.  
However, there are several shortcomings of the X-CAPM study Barberis et al. (2015) 
determine: (i) Even though some of the investors in the economy are price extrapolators, the 
model does not predict momentum in price changes: the presence of fully rational traders 
means that price changes are negatively autocorrelated at all lags. (ii) There is no mechanism 
in the model, other than high risk aversion, that can generate a large equity premium. (iii) While 
the presence of extrapolators reduces the correlation of consumption changes and price 
changes, this correlation is still much higher in the model than in actual data. 
 
3. X-CAPM Revisited 
 
While the X-CAPM study presents, with its well-developed model, a unique contribution to 
modern asset pricing literature, it fails to account for the behavior of institutional investors. A 
possible reason may be that the survey results are an aggregate of several surveys, only some 
of which were administered to institutional investors.  
Clearly, investors have different attributes and although it is a fact that most of the US 
equity market is held by institutional investors, most representative agent models of the 
individual investor are being studied. As an alternative solution, the present study uses Sentix 
data, which specifically differentiates between individual and institutional investors.  
One major expected hypothesis-testing outcome is that due to institutional investors’ 










study may completely be offset. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that institutions have 
different utility functions, consumption constraints and risk sensitivity than individuals. In as 
such, while rational individual investors may be reluctant to completely counteract the 
overvalued price, (rational) institutional investors may be more aggressive with abundant 
resources to “pull back” the market price more or completely offset the amplification effect 
caused by extrapolators. 
 
4. Literature Review 
 
Institutional investors form an important part of the trading volume in financial markets and trade 
in very large amounts and thus have a great impact on asset pricing. Hence, the assumption of 
market efficiency entailing easily and equally accessible information and implicitly perfect 
competition does not hold since not all investors are price takers.  
This, in turn, implies that equity risk premia are different for all groups of investors. 
Furthermore, heterogeneous groups of investors have different objectives, where individual 
investors trade on their own behalf and submit limit orders, institutional traders, such as money 
managers with a concrete benchmark like the market index, have a greater risk appetite and 
more leeway to submit market orders and provide liquidity. Thus, their incentives and motives 
are markedly different and so is their interactions in between other groups of investors and 
amongst themselves (the effect of peer-benchmarking was recently shown by Acharya and 
Pedrzza (2015), who estimate the asset prices effects from institutional trades due to peer-
benchmarking incentives among pension fund managers.). All of these factors and the fraction 
and, thus, power of trading, affect the asset pricing mechanism.  
Another strand of the literature argues that asset pricing is essentially determined by 
two significant phenomena: market clearing conditions and asset demand. Empirical studies 
related to the significant price impact with respect to large institutional trades are undertaken by 
scholars such as Scholes (1972), Holthausen et al. (1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993), and 
Keim and Madhavan (1996).  
Showing the impact of institutional traders, Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (2000) and 
Chen et al. (2004) present evidence from index additions and deletions, while Greenwood 
(2005) and Hau (2011) present evidence from more general index redefinitions.On the other 
hand, Basak and Pavlova (2013) assert that the presence of institutional investors results in: an 
index effect, amplification of shocks, time varying sharpe ratios which are higher in bad times, 
and an asset class effect.   
 The role of institutions and the necessity to develop an asset-pricing model based on 
heterogeneous investor types in the market is also stressed by Koijen and Yogo (2015), who 
underscore the fact that traditional asset pricing models are not fit for answering questions such 
as: 
1. Have asset markets become more liquid over the last 30 years with the growing 
importance of institutional investors? 
2. How much of the volatility and predictability of asset prices is explained by institutional 
trades? 
3. Do large investment managers amplify volatility and bad times? 
 
Koijen and Yogo (2015) propose an equilibrium model of institutional demand, whereby 
the equilibrium price vector is uniquely determined by market clearing, which equates the supply 
of each asset to aggregate demand.  
The reason that researchers till the present time have failed to account for the presence 
of heterogeneous investors, and in particular, institutions, and have instead relied upon broad 
assumptions such as those in the X-CAPM model, may have been the complexity of modelling 
diverse preferences and incentives. 
Cornell and Roll (2004), emphasizing the underlying assumption of agency theory that 
objective functions cannot be isomorphic to principals’ preferences and beliefs suggesting that 
asset pricing could differ fundamentally from what existing theory predicts, try to establish a 










money managers. The authors, focusing on the delegation process, draw attention to 
implications for research in behavioral finance. “Instead of simply noting a limitation on rational-
decision making, such as overconfidence, and then developing an asset pricing model that 
incorporates the limitation, behaviorists could analyze how the limitation influences the 
delegation process” (Cornell and Roll, 2004, p. 6). The institutional environments the authors 
envision are composed of two groups of institutional managers: passive ones that mimic the 
index and active ones trying to beat the market and employing various trading strategies. Hodor 
(2014) who studies benchmark heterogeneity, takes a different approach to identifying 
institutional investors and regards those that do not follow a specific benchmark index as retail 
investors.  
Allen (2001) argues that traditional asset pricing models assume that investors are 
investing directly in financial markets and that the role of financial institutions is ignored. He 
further explains that the reason for ignoring institutional investors being their negligible impact 
on asset prices may have been valid in the US in the 1950s when individuals directly held over 
90 percent of corporate equities, or even in 1970 when they held 68 percent, it has become 
increasingly less appropriate as time progresses. By 2000, the fraction of directly held equity 
was less than 40 percent. Allen (2001) underlines that there is clearly a potential agency 
problem when financial institutions control such a high proportion of stocks. 
 
5. I-X-CAPM Model Settings 
 
The model settings rest on an infinite-horizon model set in continuous time. There are two 
assets; a safe asset with a fixed return “r” and perfect elastic supply; and a risky asset, 
representing the aggregate stock market, with a fixed per-capita supply “Q”. The risky asset is a 
claim to a continuous dividend stream whose level per unit time evolves as an arithmetic 
Brownian motion.  
The Sentix survey data consists of “private” and “institutional” investors. Private 
investors maximize expected lifetime consumption utility and differ in their expectations about 
the future stock market return. For institutions, there is the principal agent problem in 
maximizing lifetime consumption because, on the one hand, they are trying to maximize returns 
from trading, and, on the other hand, they are trying to maximize their fees they get from 
investors. The investor, however, is interested in beating his benchmark, obtaining high returns 
but paying low fees to the institution. Furthermore, the institution operates in a profit-oriented 
corporate and competitive culture of financial institutions where one major difficulty is to retain 
clients on a continuous basis. 
The main proposition is that expected price changes are an outcome of the interaction 
of beliefs (sentiment) of heterogeneous agents in the market. Thus, the main equation is 
 




,   𝛽 > 0                                    (1) 
where, β,t,s,and dt denote the speed of mean reversion to the equilibrium price, time, 
sentiment and change in dividend over time. The value of the stock market at time  is denoted 
by  𝑃𝑡 and determined endogenously in equilibrium. 
 
The rationally “correct” dividend growth model known by the rational investor is as follows:  
 
    tDDt ddtgdD =                       (2) 
 
 where, Dg  and D  are the expected value and standard deviation of dividend 
changes, respectively, and where 
t  is a standard one-dimensional Wiener process. Both Dg  










Deviations from this model from the perspectives of institutional and extrapolating 
investors, respectively, are 
    𝑑𝐷𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑔𝐷
𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐷𝑑𝜔𝑡





𝑒 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐷𝑑𝜔𝑡
𝑒                                                     (4)      
 
where, the perceived expected dividend change depends explicitly on Eq. (2).1  
  
For institutional and extrapolating investors, the following equations for expected dividend 
change apply, respectively, 
 
  𝑔𝐷
𝑎(𝑆𝑡) = (1 − 𝛽𝐵)𝜆0
𝑎𝑟 + ((1 − 𝛽𝑎𝐵)𝜆1
𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽𝑎𝐵𝑟)𝑆𝑡                          (5)                     
 
and  
   𝑔𝐷
𝑒 (𝑆𝑡) = (1 − 𝛽𝐵)𝜆0
𝑒𝑟 + ((1 − 𝛽𝑒𝐵)𝜆1
𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑒𝐵𝑟)𝑆𝑡                          (6)              
 
 
where, we denote 𝐵 ∈ (0, 𝛽−1).  
 
The institutional investors’ and extrapolators’ expected change in the aggregate stock 
price, respectively, is 
 
     𝑔𝑝,𝑡
𝑎 (𝑆𝑡) = 𝜆0
𝑎 + 𝜆1




      𝑔𝑝,𝑡
𝑒 (𝑆𝑡) = 𝜆0
𝑒 + 𝜆1
𝑒𝑆𝑡                                          (8)      
  
 The 𝛽, 𝜆0 and  𝜆1 coefficients of equations (5), (6), (7), (8) are obtained through a two-
stage regression analysis of equations (10) and (11), respectively. 
Similar to the study of Baberis et al. (2015), we do not take a strong stand on the source 
of extrapolation. Isolated, extrapolators could form their extrapolative expectations on the 
“representativeness” heuristic. However, different from the study of Barberis et al. (2015), we 
assume that the institutional investors form an important part of our aggregate model, based on 
the interaction with institutional (a.k.a. professional) investors, extrapolators’ could use several 
other heuristics such as “herding”.  
For the institutional investors Eq. (9a) encompasses their beliefs about the expected 
price change and the evolution of future prices 
 









𝑎                    (9a) 
 
whereas in extrapolators’ minds prices evolve as shown in Eq. (9b) 
 









𝑒                                     (9b) 
 
                                                          











 From the institutions’ (extrapolators') perspective 𝜔𝑡
𝑎 (𝜔𝑡
𝑒) is a Wiener process. The 
drift term simply reflects the expectations in Eq. (7) and in Eq. (8), respectively, while the 
instantaneous volatility 𝜎𝑝
𝑎 and 𝜎𝑝
𝑒 is the actual instantaneous volatility that is endogenously 
determined in equilibrium and that we assume is a constant. Since volatility can easily be 
estimated from past data, we assume that institutions and extrapolators know its true value. 
Both investors’ expectations about price change over a finite horizon are given in Eq. 
(10) 
























       (10)            
where, )(1= 1 m , investors’ expected instantaneous price change at time t , )(10  tS  
multiplied by the time horizon )( 1 tt  .  
To determine 𝛽, 𝜆0 and 𝜆1 we specify Eq. (11) 
       )(),ˆ(ˆˆ= 110
1
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 , where 𝛽 and 𝑛 
parameterize how far back investors look when forming their beliefs.2  In the case where 𝜆1 is 
fixed at one, Eq. (11) becomes 








E .                       (12) 
 Equations (10), (11), (12) form a system that is necessary to obtain the  , 0 , and 1  




We have used Sentix private and institutional investors’ economic sentiment data on the US 
(expectations regarding future economic outlook and current economic sentiment) and S&P 500 
data. All data series were logarithmic transformed and tested for stationarity using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The frequency of the data is daily. A two-stage OLS model was 
used to derive that the parameters ensure the endogeneity of the variables and instrumental 
variables. We verify that instrumental variables are not correlated with error terms in time t. We 
use equations (11) and (12) to determine the parameter values for the 𝛽, 𝜆0 and  𝜆1 
coefficients. 
As shown in Table 1, comparing the coefficients for institutional current vs private 
current results, we determine that: (i) for institutions the 𝛽 coefficient for both equations is 
higher than that for private individuals, and all values are significant at the 5% level except for 
the 𝛽 for institutional investors’ current beliefs with respect to Eq. 11, (ii) the 𝜆0 coefficient is 
higher (lower) for institutions in Eq.  (11) (Eq. (12)) and all values are significant at the 5% level, 
(iii) 𝜆1 for institutions is lower in Eq. (11), however the 𝛽 value for the former is insignificant at 
the 5% level and fixed at 1 in Eq. (12) for both.  
                                                          










Comparing the coefficients for institutional future vs private future results we find that: (i) 
for institutions the 𝛽 coefficient for Eq. (11) is lower than that for private investors, however the 
former is significant whereas the latter is insignificant at the 5% level. As for Eq. (12) the 𝛽 
value for institutional investors’ future expectations is higher in comparison to that of private 
investors, however, it is insignificant at the 5% level, whereas that for the latter type of investors 
is significant at the 5% level, (ii) the 𝜆0 coefficient is higher for institutions is significant and 
lower for Eq. (11), whereas for Eq. (12) the 𝜆0 coefficient is insignificant for institutions but 
significant for private investors, (iii) 𝜆1 for institutions is significant at 5% and insignificant for 
private investors in Eq. (11) and fixed at 1 in Eq. (11) for both.  
 
Table 1. Parameter values based on I-X-CAPM 








Coefficient Eq. (11) Eq. (12) Eq. (11) Eq. (12) Eq. (11) Eq. (12) Eq. (11) Eq. (12) 
𝛽 9.85 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.89 0.85 4.76 0.76 
[t-stat] 0.05 18.20 25.15 26.29 48.07 0.00 00.00 56.57 
𝜆0 1.00 0.69 0.65 0.73 0.88 0.94 1.00 0.86 
[t-stat] 18.99 20.18 25.95 32.96 43.01 0.00 32.68 57.75 
𝜆1 0.34  1.06  0.34  -0.01  
[t-stat] 0.00  398.88  11.08  0.77  
Chi-square 360.8929 584.8921 2540.662 3254.494 505.8812 24.60562 2638.006 14837.48 
Sum sq. res. 8097.29 57.43 6019966 8897.27 190.89 2.35 80.28 8895.37 
Durbin Watson  1.86 2.44 4.32 2.01 1.79 2.00 1.60 2.01 
Note: Institutional Current, Private Current, Institutional Future, Private Future refer to USA Sentix 
Economic Sentiment, Current Situation and Future expectations of Institutional / Private Investors. 
 
 Comparing the coefficients for future and current results, we observe that: (i) in the case 
for institutions in Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 𝛽 coefficient is higher though insignificant at the 5% 
level (lower yet significant at the 5%level) when it comes to the current outlook, with regard 
to 𝜆0, in Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 𝜆0 coefficient is higher and significant at the 5% level (lower but 
significant at the 5% level) for current results, with regard to 𝜆1, in Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 
𝜆1 coefficient is the same but insignificant at the 5% level (fixed at 1) for current outlook, (ii) for 
private individuals in Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 𝛽 coefficient is lower but significant at 5% level 
(lower and significant at %5 as well) when it comes to the current outlook, with regard to 𝜆0, in 
Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 𝜆0 coefficient is lower (lower) for current outlook, where all 
𝜆0 coefficients are significant at the 5% level. With regard to 𝜆1, in Eq. (11) (Eq. (12)) the 
𝜆1 coefficient is significant at the 5% level in the current outlook whereas in the future outlook it 
is not significant at the 5% level (fixed at 1) for current outlook.  
 As for the interpretation of these findings comparing institutional vs individual investors 
on the current economic outlook expectation level in the realm of Eq. (11), 𝛽 is 9.85 but not 
significant on the 5% level vs a significant 𝛽 value of 0.65. Thus, it is difficult to compare and to 
contrast in this context. In this realm, we cannot comment on whether or not sentiment reverts 
more quickly to its equilibrium level (mean – reversion). The results for 𝜆1 are again not 
significant for institutional investors. However, more interpretable findings are present for future 
economic outlook. As such, 𝜆0 is lower with a value for 0.88 vs 1 for institutional investors in 
comparison to private investors, where both values are significant at the 5% level.  
As stated in Barberis et al. (2015) that if 𝜆0 is 0 and 𝜆1 is 1, the extrapolators think that 
sentiment follows a random walk whereas in reality it is mean reverting. According to our output 
𝜆1 is close to 1, however 𝜆0 is different from 0, for institutional investors, future beliefs. Thus, 










unbiased outlook and can judge future situations realistically. Another interpretation based on 
our output table is that the private institutional investors in their current outlook are also 





The role of institutions and the necessity to develop an asset pricing model based on 
heterogeneous investor types in the market is also stressed by Koijen and Yogo (2015), who 
underscore the fact that traditional asset pricing models are not fit for answering questions such 
as liquidity, asset price volatility and regimes switching issues.  
 The present study has sought to complement the X-CAPM through integrating the 
assumption of heterogeneous investors. While the integration of institutional investors and the 
differentiation between expectations regarding current and future economic outlook is a novelty 
in the X-CAPM literature, we have come to the conclusion that more data is necessary. Our aim 
was to show that the institutional investor, while still displaying “irrational” or “rationally 
bounded” behavior, is closer to the rational-decision making mechanism compared to the 
individual, who is closer to the role of an extrapolator. While this conclusion is a little far-fetched, 
there is still some evidence in our findings, which may imply that institutions revert quicker to 
their means than individual investors do.   
In some countries including the US, most institutional investors may be pension funds. 
This is an important consideration since the nature of the institutional investor (hedge fund, 
mutual fund, pension fund, etc.) determines its motivation, time and consumption preferences. 
Institutions may act from time to time for hedging, arbitrage or speculation purposes. Thus, 
perhaps dividing investors into rational, institutional and extrapolator and building models on 
these broad categories may lead to only theoretical models. However, for practical applicability 
purposes, other factors such as objectives and incentives as well, need to be taken into 
account. Clearly, there is still a lot of room for research in asset pricing. With the present work, 
the authors hope to have contributed to the behavioral asset pricing literature and have tried to 
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